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A B S T R A C T   
This paper addresses the implementation of technology-forcing policies in open-ended diffusion processes that 
involve companies and regulators as well as consumers and civil society actors. Mobilising insights from the 
societal embedding of technology framework and policy steering theories, we investigate two implementation 
dilemmas that relate to an overarching tension between flexibility (to enable technological learning and 
stakeholder engagement) and coordinated push (to focus actors and drive deployment): a) early or late formu-
lation of initial targets, and b) technocratic or emergent-adaptive implementation styles. We investigate these 
dilemmas with four comparative case studies of smart electricity meters between 2000 to 2019, which diffused 
rapidly in the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal, but decelerated in the UK. We relate these differences to policy 
choices, and identify two patterns for successful implementation of technology-forcing policies: a) start with 
early targets and a technocratic style, but make adjustments if there are substantial protests or technical prob-
lems, and b) start with an emergent-adaptive style and formulate and enforce targets later, once technical and 
social stabilisation has occurred.   
1. Introduction 
Technology-forcing describes a regulatory strategy to accelerate the 
development and deployment of innovation by setting demanding per-
formance standards or targets that are difficult to meet with existing 
technologies or implementation patterns. This strategy was relatively 
common to address environmental and societal problems in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Historical examples include the 1970 Clean Air Act, which 
articulated performance targets (90% reduction in hydrocarbon, carbon 
monoxide and nitrogen oxides emissions by 1975/76) that accelerated 
the introduction of advanced automotive emissions controls (Gerard and 
Lave, 2005; Lee et al., 2010); the 1971 New Source Performance Stan-
dards that accelerated the development and deployment of flue gas 
desulfurization systems (Taylor et al., 2005); and the 1966 Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA), which pushed safety innovations 
including airbags into American cars (Gerard and Lave, 2007; Geels and 
Penna, 2015). 
In these cases, the technologies to meet these performance targets 
did not exist (or only embryonically) when the targets were formulated. 
The cases were thus mostly about induced innovation. Once developed, 
diffusion of the new technologies was about requiring companies to 
install them in cars or power plants, which did not involve consumers. 
The popularity of technology-forcing policies faded in the 1980s and 
1990s, in part due to enthusiasm about liberalization and market-based 
policies and antipathies against governments ‘picking winners’. Since 
then, increasing concern about climate change and other environmental 
problems has revived interest in technology-forcing policies. Examples 
include California’s 1990 zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandate, which 
specified ZEV sales targets that accelerated the development of electric 
vehicles (Wesseling et al., 2015); Renewable Portfolio Standards, which 
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many US states adopted in the 2000s to push utilities to produce a 
certain percentage of electricity from renewables by a specified date; the 
EU’s 2003 Biofuels Directive, which specified increasing targets for 
biofuel mixing in automotive fuels (5.75% in 2010 and 10% in 2020); 
and the EU’s 2010 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, which set 
a target for all new buildings to be nearly zero-energy by 2020. 
These more recent cases involve sales or deployment targets, indi-
cating increased use of technology-forcing policies for accelerating the 
diffusion of existing but under-utilised technologies. The cases again 
focus on deployment by companies, except for the ZEV-case which also 
involved consumer adoption. 
Extant scholarship conceptualises the implementation of technology- 
forcing policies as a contested process, involving struggles between 
policymakers and companies. On the one hand, policymakers push 
companies to accelerate the development or deployment of new tech-
nologies to address social or environmental problems. On the other 
hand, companies are reluctant because the new technologies add costs 
or lack consumer demand. Scholars have identified multiple factors that 
shape these implementation struggles, including the perceived credi-
bility and capability of regulators to maintain and enforce targets 
(Gerard and Lave, 2005); tensions between regulatory stringency and 
uncertainty about technological feasibility (Lee et al., 2010); corporate 
resistance strategies such as litigation, lobbying or the exploitation of 
information advantages over policymakers (Wesseling et al., 2015; 
Taylor et al., 2005); and corporate compliance with targets (through 
increased R&D and deployment). Because implementation struggles 
unfold over multiple years, Gerard and Lave’s (2007: 3) find that the 
effects of technology-forcing policies depend on “characteristics of the 
implementation process” (emphasis added). 
We aim to make empirical and theoretical contributions to the 
technology-forcing literature. Empirically, we add a comparative case 
study of smart electricity meters which are a subset of advanced 
metering infrastructure to measure and analyse electricity usage and 
automate communication with energy suppliers. First discussed in the 
1970s, smart meter debates gained momentum in the 1990s, when ICT- 
devices became more sophisticated and available. They became sub-
jected to technology-forcing policies in the late 2000s. The 2006 Euro-
pean Union Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services Directive 
(2006/32/EC) required member states to develop stronger demand-side 
policies, and Article 13 mentioned smart meters as an important 
element. A later Directive (2009/72/EC) articulated a specific target: if 
cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) of smart meters were positive, then mem-
ber states were required to deploy them to at least 80% of consumers by 
2020 or within eight years of such a CBA. 
The smart meter case is also about accelerated diffusion, but it de-
viates from previous technology-forcing studies in several ways. First, 
the case involved not just policymakers and companies (who imple-
mented the technology), but also millions of consumers (in whose homes 
smart meters were installed) and civil society actors (who shaped public 
debates and social acceptance). Second, companies mostly welcomed 
smart meters because of their problem-solving potential or envisaged 
cost savings (e.g. no more meter reader visits, fewer queries about 
estimated bills, simpler consumer switching). Third, smart meters are a 
more complex technology for incumbent companies than some previous 
cases (like power station scrubbers or catalytic converters in cars). One 
reason is that IT-hardware, software, and standards are particularly 
prone to unforeseen complications or incompatibility problems (Night-
ingale et al., 2003), which complicate implementation. Another reason 
is that the technical knowledge base of smart meters differs substantially 
from existing technical capabilities of energy companies, which 
complicates deployment.1 Smart meters can also be configured in 
diverse ways, using various kinds and combinations of measurement 
devices, digital communications hubs, software programs, and wireless 
data transmission standards. They can also include or exclude In-Home 
Displays (IHD), which give consumers real-time information about do-
mestic electricity use. Combined with the other two reasons, this means 
that identifying the best configuration of components is challenging. 
Due to these differences, the implementation of technology-forcing 
policies for smart meters has particular complexities and dilemmas 
that we aim to address by making conceptual contributions. One 
complexity is that multiple stakeholders are involved, which not only 
increases policy complexity, but also poses challenges for implementa-
tion and engagement styles: while technocratic engagement with com-
panies is difficult but (occasionally) accepted, the heavy-handed use of 
power and authority is even more difficult in policy engagement with 
consumers and civil society, and may generate social protest. 
Another complexity is that smart meter technology had not yet sta-
bilised at the time of the 2009 EU Directive. This created a policy 
dilemma for the timing of roll-out target setting, which could be 
formulated ‘early’ (i.e. before technical stabilisation) to articulate clear 
directionality (but with the risk of premature lock-in) or late (i.e. after 
technical stabilisation) to allow time for learning processes (but leading 
to a delayed start). Using insights from four policy steering theories, we 
will identify two options for each dilemma (technocratic or adaptive- 
emergent style; early or late timing of target-setting) that prioritise 
different relevant dimensions in the implementation of technology- 
forcing policies (enforcement, network governance, learning, and 
directionality). 
Using four country cases, we will investigate how policy choices for 
these dilemmas influenced accelerated diffusion trajectories of smart 
meters between 2000 and 2019. The four selected countries are the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway2 and Portugal. We chose a 
comparative research design because this is relatively novel in the 
technology-forcing literature (which mostly uses single cases), and 
because the four-country comparison enables empirical investigation of 
choices with regard to the two implementation dilemmas. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the concep-
tual framework. Section 3 discusses case selection and data collection. 
Section 4 presents the four country case studies. Section 5 makes a 
comparative analysis, and section 6 concludes. 
2. Conceptual framework 
To conceptualise the broader, multi-actor diffusion process that 
characterizes smart-meter deployment, we use the societal embedding 
framework (Rip and Kemp 1998; Deuten et al., 1997; Mylan et al., 2019; 
Kanger et al., 2019), which understands diffusion as a process of mutual 
alignment between a new technology and four environments (Fig. 1). 
While previous technology-forcing studies mostly focused on new 
technologies in business and policy environments, the societal embed-
ding framework also acknowledges user and socio-cultural environ-
ments that were relevant for smart meter diffusion.3 
Drawing on sociology of innovation and evolutionary economics, the 
societal embedding framework emphasizes mutual adjustments between 
1 This technical knowledge base difference was less pronounced for catalytic 
converters and scrubbers, which automakers and utilities were able to inter-
nalise through dedicated R&D programs and hiring policies (Taylor et al., 2005; 
Penna and Geels, 2012; Lee et al., 2010).  
2 Although Norway is not a member of the European Union, it often aims for 
close regulatory alignment to facilitate trade and other forms of exchange.  
3 Kanger et al. (2019) distinguish the transnational community of technical 
experts, who exchange experiences and discuss technical standards, as a fifth 
environment. We do not include this in our analysis for reasons of practical 
feasibility and to not overcomplicate our framework. 
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new technologies and the four environments: “Technology adoption is 
an active process, with elements of innovation in itself. (…) Behaviours, 
organization and society have to re-arrange themselves to adopt, and 
adapt to, the novelty. Both the technology and social context change in a 
process that can be seen as co-evolution” (Rip and Kemp, 1998: 389). 
Combinations of the societal embedding framework and different policy 
steering theories (see Voß et al., 2007, for an insightful overview) are 
useful for better understanding the two implementation dilemmas for 
technology-forcing policies. 
Timing of target-setting 
With regard to technology, the societal embedding framework em-
phasises that adjustments are especially common in early developmental 
stages, called ‘formative phase’ (Bento and Wilson, 2016) or ‘era of 
ferment’ (Anderson and Tushman, 1990), when there are many tech-
nological uncertainties, multiple design variations, surprises and teeth-
ing problems. Real-world experiments or demonstration projects are 
especially conducive in this phase to stimulate technological learning 
processes that may gradually reduce uncertainties and stabilise the 
technology (Hellsmark et al., 2016). The emergence of a dominant 
design then signals a shift to the ‘growth phase’ (Bento and Wilson, 
2016) or ‘era of incremental change’ (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). 
Subsequent diffusion may still involve technological adjustments 
(Fleck, 1988), but these are usually smaller than in the formative phase. 
These considerations sharpen the dilemma of the timing of target- 
setting. On the one hand, the basic motivation of technology-forcing 
policy is to set early demanding targets so that these accelerate the 
development and diffusion of new technologies. Policy theories such as 
new public management (Lane, 2000), mission-oriented innovation 
policy (Mazzucato, 2018) and the literature on promises, visions and 
goals (Van Lente, 1993; Sovacool, 2019) also suggest that policymakers 
can steer change processes by providing early directionality. 
Possible advantages of early formulation of targets and technology 
specifications are signalling political leadership, creating clarity about 
the direction of travel, and accelerating change by convincing actors to 
mobilize resources and implement the technology (Van Lente, 1993). 
Potential risks and drawbacks of early target-setting are that this reduces 
the time for technological learning and adjustments, which are essential 
in early phases according to the societal embedding framework. 
Consequently, the early targets may later turn out to be unrealistic or 
contribute to sub-optimal technology specification and lock-in. 
On the other hand, the societal embedding framework implies that it 
is safer to engage in later formulation of targets and specifications. This 
gives more time for real-world technological learning through pilots or 
demonstration projects (Hellsmark et al., 2016), which may lead to more 
informed target-setting and implementation choices. Policy learning 
theories, which address problems of complexity and knowledge un-
certainties, also suggest that learning-by-doing should precede formal 
commitments. Lindblom’s (1979) disjointed incrementalism approach, 
for instance, emphasises step-wise learning (‘muddling through’) and 
policy experiments to prepare the ground for later decisions. And the 
adaptive governance approach suggests that interventions in complex 
environments may have unforeseen consequences that require subse-
quent adjustments (Walters, 1986; Lee, 1999). Both of these policy 
theories would thus imply later target-setting in technology-forcing 
policies, once stabilisation has progressed. A potential drawback is 
that prolonged experimentation and deliberation may prolong uncer-
tainty and delay full-scale commitment and diffusion. 
There is no singular effective position in this dilemma. The literature 
offers successful examples of both early targets driving innovation and 
diffusion (e.g. the technology-forcing cases mentioned above) and of late 
targets being formulated as the diffusion process was unfolding, e.g. 
Austrian biomass district heating (Geels and Johnson, 2018) or the 
German energy transition (Geels et al., 2016). 
Implementation style 
With regard to stakeholders in the multiple environments, the soci-
etal embedding framework suggests that technology diffusion involves 
manifold activities and adjustment processes (which are discussed more 
deeply in Deuten et al., 1997; Mylan et al., 2019; Kanger et al., 2019). 
Companies may have to adjust production facilities, skills, or supply and 
distribution chains (Bolton and Hannon, 2016). Consumer activities may 
include purchase and adoption of the new technology, which are shaped 
by many factors including relative costs and performance, attitudes and 
perceptions (Rogers, 1996), and trust in the technology, suppliers and 
regulators (Mumford and Gray, 2010), which, in turn, are shaped by 
company reputations, people’s views on policymakers, and 
media-reported consumer experiences. Public debates and NGO activ-
ities may further shape cultural meanings and social acceptance of new 
technologies (Hielscher and Sovacool, 2018; Roberts and Geels, 2018). 
Technological diffusion may also require new policies that influence the 
production or the use of new technologies, e.g. R&D subsidies, capital 
grants, safety regulations, reliability standards, adoption subsidies, or 
infrastructure investment programs (Brand et al., 2013). 
Because many of these processes, particularly in the user and socio- 
cultural environments, are outside of policymakers’ control, these con-
siderations sharpen the dilemma of implementation style for technology- 
forcing policies. While top-down target-setting and enforcement 
(through warnings or penalties) may be feasible in interactions with 
firms, it is often less acceptable for policymakers (in democratic soci-
eties) to order consumers or civil society groups on what technology to 
adopt or accept. Top-down enforcement may be particularly chal-
lenging, or even exacerbate social acceptance problems (Scott, 1998), 
when consumers are less interested in the technology than policymakers 
anticipated or when public debates frame technologies negatively. 
Coalescing suggestions from innovation scholars (Garud and Karnøe; 
2003; Sovacool, 2010; Hatanaka, 2020), we distinguish ‘technocratic’ 
and ‘emergent-adaptive’ implementation styles, which we will elaborate 
using policy steering theories. 
A technocratic implementation style is characterized by centralized 
coordination, with a strong role for the state (and corporate lobbying) in 
selecting targets, specifying technological parameters, and driving 
deployment of the chosen technical design. Planning theories, which 
advocate this command-and-control style of steering, assume that poli-
cymakers have both sufficient expertise (to make correct analyses) and 
sufficient power or authority to enforce implementation (Friedmann, 
1987; Cowley, 2015). While allowing for some (controlled) experi-
mentation and (techno-economic) learning during the formative phase, 
this style approaches diffusion as a relatively straightforward process of 
deployment and delivery. One possible advantage is that authoritative 
decisions can create clarity and focus, which may help to coordinate and 
align efficient resource deployment (e.g. authority, money, technical 
competencies, organizational skills) by multiple actors. Another possible 
Fig. 1. Relevant environments for new products and practices (adapted from 
Deuten et al., 1997: 134) 
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advantage is that the monitoring of implementation and the enforce-
ment of compliance (through warnings or penalties) may accelerate 
diffusion. 
But technocratic approaches also carry well-known risks (Scott, 
1998; Voß et al, 2007). First, the focus on efficient techno-economic 
deployment may lead technocrats to ignore socio-cultural consider-
ations and risks for particular social groups (Scott, 1998). Second, 
technocrats often engage in a narrow way with stakeholders (e.g. con-
sumers, citizens, civil society groups), approaching them as ‘obstacles’ 
to be overcome (Devine-Wright, 2005) or as targets of information 
campaigns to be ‘educated’. But if many stakeholders feel that their 
concerns are ignored, this interaction style may create alienation and 
social acceptance problems. Third, the presumption of superior knowl-
edge may make technocrats reluctant to accommodate change during 
the deployment process, which is understood to be more about ‘pushing’ 
than about mutual adjustment. Although the technocratic style has ac-
quired a bad reputation, and many case studies illustrate its failures 
(Scott, 1998; Garud and Karnøe, 2003), there are also examples of suc-
cessful state-led planning and technology implementation (e.g. Turn-
heim and Geels, 2019; Lee et al., 2019; Mah, 2020). 
The emergent-adaptive implementation style assumes that expertise 
and power are more distributed and therefore places greater emphasis 
on decentralised learning and stakeholder deliberation (with firms, 
citizens, or NGOs), which may lead to technological or policy adjust-
ments (Voß et al., 2007). This style draws on network governance the-
ories (Rhodes, 1997; Hendriks, 2008) which suggest that inclusion, 
consultation and interactive learning are more subtle way of achieving 
coordination. Distributed real-world initiatives and small on-the-ground 
projects may act as vehicles for interactive learning, while public 
hearings and consultations can stimulate the voicing of experiences and 
concerns. The resulting lessons and insights may then lead to adjust-
ments that inform subsequent larger projects, making the overall 
implementation processes more adaptive and flexible (Garud and 
Karnøe, 2003; Geels and Raven, 2006). 
The emergent-adaptive style also has potential drawbacks. First, 
multiple distributed projects and initiatives may lead to fragmentation, 
especially if interactive learning is limited and actors do not exchange 
information (Turnheim et al., 2018). Second, learning and stakeholder 
engagement take time and may delay formal policy commitment and 
initial diffusion (Ciplet and Harrison, 2020). 
Since both implementation styles have advantages and drawbacks, 
we do not privilege one style over the other. Rather, we propose that 
both styles are extremes, and that countries may use a mix of styles and 
combine elements of both in actual implementation programs. Our 
comparative smart meter case study empirically investigates what (mix 
of) implementation styles different countries adopted and how this 
influenced diffusion trajectories. 
Table 1 summarises the advantages and potential drawbacks of the 
different choices for the two implementation dilemmas. The analysis in 
section 5 will indicate how these played out in the different country- 
cases. 
3. Research design and methodology 
3.1. Case selection 
To investigate the relationship between technology-forcing policies 
and accelerated diffusion of smart meters, our comparative case study 
design focuses on four countries: the United Kingdom, Norway, Portugal 
and the Netherlands. Several considerations informed the selection of 
these countries. First, we wanted to investigate countries that an early 
overview of the European Smart Metering Landscape identified as ‘dy-
namic movers’ (see Fig. 2), which means they had (at that time) a clear 
roll-out path due to specified targets and/or engagement in major pilot 
projects. From this group, we excluded Sweden, Italy, Finland and 
Malta, because these countries started roll-out programs before the 2009 
EU Directive (for country-specific reasons such as reducing electricity 
theft in Italy) and because they used simpler, early-generation smart 
meters. 
Second, from the remaining set, we chose two countries that 
attempted early target-setting and two countries with late targets. Using 
the benefit of hindsight, we also compared realised diffusion trajectories 
(see Fig. 3) with the targets, to select countries that looked particularly 
interesting or puzzling to us. The following arguments underpinned our 
selection:  
• The UK set targets early (in 2009), committing the country to 100% 
roll-out by 2020. Despite substantial initial preparation, diffusion 
proceeded slower than anticipated (with electricity smart meters 
reaching only 9.8 million homes in 2019 out of a total of 27.8 million 
homes), leading the government to postpone the deadline to 2024.  
• The Dutch government attempted to set early targets (in 2008), but 
these encountered societal opposition over privacy concerns, which 
delayed acceptance until 2011. While this led Zhou and Brown 
(2017: 26) to characterize the Dutch case as “slow policy adoption 
and technology implementation”, Fig. 3 shows that diffusion accel-
erated in recent years, placing the country on track to meet its 2020 
targets.  
• Norway was late in establishing its smart meter program, but met 
this target through very rapid diffusion during 2017 and 2018.  
• Portugal arrived late (in 2015) at a positive cost-benefit analysis, but 
did not follow this up with an official target. Instead, smart meter 
roll-out was stimulated through large-scale projects and imple-
mentation incentives, which succeeded in accelerating diffusion. 
As the brief summaries indicate, these four countries show inter-
esting similarities and contrasts in diffusion speed and trajectory, which 
we aim to describe and explain by investigating mutual adjustments 
between smart meter technologies and the four environments and 
associated social groups. 
Our research design and case selection arguments imply that we treat 
the countries as four independent cases in which national contexts and 
Table 1 
Summary of implementation dilemmas in technology-forcing policies   
Advantages or benefits Risks or drawbacks 




- Creates clarity about 
direction of travel; 
- Stimulates early 
commitments and resource 
allocation; 
- Signals political 
leadership. 
- Unrealistic targets that 
prove difficult to meet, 
leading to postponement 
and/or impression of 
failure; 
- Early technology 
specifications may turn 
out to be wrong. 




- Creates more time for 
learning and adjustments, 
leading to more informed 
later targets and 
specifications. 
- Late formal targets may 
create uncertainty, delay 





- Authoritative decisions 
may create focus and 
coordinate resource 
deployment; 




- Limited and narrow 
stakeholder engagement 
may create social 
acceptance problems; 
- Ignores broader 
considerations 





- Decentralized projects 
allow for interactive 
learning and mutual 
adjustments; 
- Learning and stakeholder 
engagement make 
implementation more 
adaptive and flexible. 
- Diffusion may be slowed 
by fragmentation and 
limited exchange 
between projects; 
- Slow initial diffusion 
because of time- 
consuming articulation 
processes and delayed 
formal commitment.  
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interactions between domestic groups (firms, policymakers, consumers, 
civil society groups) are likely to be most important in shaping diffusion 
trajectories. We acknowledge that transnational influences may play 
some role, but do not consider these in the analysis. 
3.2. Data-collection and analysis 
Since the smart meter roll-out remains a recent and ongoing process, 
reporting has not fully stabilized. This posed challenges for data- 
collection, especially for the Portugal case, where the lack of formal 
government targets means there is limited official reporting and thus 
scarce data. We therefore used multiple data sources, including aca-
demic publications (which are abundant for the UK and the Netherlands, 
sufficient for Norway and relatively sparse for Portugal), government 
publications (e.g. White Papers, cost-benefit assessments, progress up-
dates by regulators or other official bodies including dedicated web-
pages), reports by corporate organisations involved in roll-out programs 
(e.g. Smart Energy GB; Netbeheer Nederland; Energy Norway; Energias 
de Portugal), newspaper articles, reports and commentaries by wider 
stakeholders (e.g. Consumers’ Association; National Audit Office; Insti-
tute of Directors; Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands). Addi-
tionally, some of the authors have in-depth knowledge of three of our 
four countries through their involvement in previous smart meter 
research projects that used primary data-collection methods, including a 
UK media discourse analysis in 2017, followed by 16 expert interviews 
and a UK focus group in 2018, living lab analysis (including interviews 
and focus groups) of 46 Norwegian households, and 80 Portuguese en-
ergy sector interviews, investigating solar energy and smart meter 
uptake. 
This diversity of data-sources enabled us to find information for all 
the conceptual categories from the societal embedding framework, and 
also afforded a greater degree of potential triangulation. The first step in 
the research process was to construct concise first-round descriptions of 
how smart-meter diffusion trajectories unfolded in the four countries, 
triangulating the different data-sources and organizing them along the 
conceptual categories. In a second step, we compared the four cases and 
reflected on similarities and differences in outcomes and diffusion tra-
jectories. We had several rounds of discussion, trying out different 
Fig. 2. Mapping smart meter programs in European countries (Smart Regions, 2012: 19)  
Fig. 3. Smart meter diffusion trajectories four countries (constructed using the best data available for each year from the UK Department of Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, Netbeheer Nederland, Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, and Portuguese Energy Services Regulatory Authority) 
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analytical schemes to interpret the data, until we settled on a focus on 
implementation styles and the timing of formulating initial targets and 
roll-out specifications. In a third step, we adjusted the case-descriptions 
to better highlight these issues, and prepared the ground for the struc-
tured analytical comparison in the fourth step, which further articulated 
different patterns in the cases. So, although the article follows the 
normal linear and logical writing format, the actual research process 
involved iterations and interactions between theory and data (Alford, 
1998; Van Maanen et al., 2007). 
The case descriptions in the next section are brief due to space 
constraints and focus on the main developments. This means that it was, 
unfortunately, not possible to address all details and intricacies, though 
we do cite more detailed extant thematic literature. To capture temporal 
patterns, each case is divided into three periods, which discuss the initial 
drive for smart meters, subsequent preparation, and mass-roll-out. For 
each period, we describe the main developments in technology and the 
four environments from the societal embedding framework. De-
scriptions of some environments are brief or absent when little 
happened in a particular period. Section 5 makes a comparative analysis 
of the four cases, using the conceptual framework. 
4. Results: Four diverging smart meters case studies 
4.1. The Netherlands 
4.1.1. Top-down government planning (2005-2008) 
Business environment: Following electricity market liberalization in 
2004, smart meters were first proposed as part of meter market 
restructuring for households and small businesses (Cuijpers and Koops, 
2013). The eight Dutch Distributed System Operators (DSOs) were also 
interested in smart meters as tools to improve operational efficiency and 
correct administrative problems with billing. 
Policy environment: Policymakers perceived smart meters as a way 
of facilitating more energy market competition (easy switch for con-
sumer) and stimulating behaviour change and energy savings (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011). A 2005 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) suggested 
a positive business case of approximately 1.3 billion euros (SenterNo-
vem, 2005). Policy debates gained momentum with the 2006 EU 
Directive, which the Dutch government interpreted as a justification for 
the introduction of smart meters. It was also expected that the roll-out of 
smart metering would stimulate the introduction of prepayment and 
flexible tariff schemes (Hoenkamp et al., 2011). 
In 2008, the government put forward a Smart Meter Bill, which 
proposed a 100% roll-out that would be mandatory, backed up by hefty 
fines or imprisonment for people refusing one (Hoenkamp et al., 2011). 
The proposed technical specifications meters would also include 
in-home displays; an alarm for unexpected peak usage; real-time 
measuring; possibilities for remote programming of appliances; and 
possibilities for communication with other meters. 
4.1.2. Public protests and policy adjustments (2008-2013) 
Civil society: The government’s proposal encountered heated public 
protests in 2008-2009, which led to a switch from a top-down to a more 
collaborative policy approach (Cuijpers and Koops, 2013). Foremost 
were the issues of privacy and public distrust, which centred on anxieties 
of smart meters as representing a ‘spy in the home’ (Naus et al., 2015). 
The Consumers’ Association published a report in 2008, which claimed 
that a mandatory roll-out of the meters would constitute an infringe-
ment of the right to privacy (Hoenkamp et al., 2011). This violation was 
due to the automatic remote reading of energy use every fifteen minutes, 
as specified by the National Technical Agreement (NTA) 8130 Bill. The 
Dutch Applied Research Institute also published a report criticizing the 
smart meter’s NTA 8130 standard. They argued that the meter did not 
provide a solution for sustainability or energy efficiency as the display 
was not different from the old meter and thus would not influence 
consumer’s energy awareness (KEMA, 2012). As public debates became 
widespread, concerns were also taken up by the Committee for the 
Protection of Personal Data, which advised against the smart meter NTA 
due to its inconsistency with the Personal Data Protection Act (KEMA, 
2012). 
Policy environment: Responding to these public concerns, the Dutch 
Senate rejected the government proposal in 2009. The subsequent po-
litical debates resulted in a revised legal framework in 2010, which 
stipulated that the roll-out would be voluntary with various options for 
consumers who could: a) keep the traditional meter, b) have a smart 
meter where no data is transmitted automatically, or c) limit automatic 
data transmission to bi-monthly reading, annual billing, supplier 
changes and relocation (KEMA, 2012). 
Technology: The legal changes also implied changes in technical 
specifications so that Dutch smart meters would not satisfy three func-
tions that meters in many other countries would: a) advanced tariff 
systems, b) remote ON/OFF control of the supply, and c) fraud pre-
vention and detection (European Commission, 2019). But the smart 
meters would still allow the following functionalities: allow remote 
reading by the operator, provide two-way communication for mainte-
nance and control, provide readings directly to consumer and/or any 
third party, upgrade readings frequently enough to enable energy saving 
schemes, and provide secure data communications. 
Because the smart meter programme had changed substantially, a 
second CBA was conducted in 2010 (KEMA, 2012), which concluded 
there was still a positive business case of around 770 million euro, 
despite more limited functionality (European Commission, 2019). The 
largest benefits were estimated to come from reduced energy con-
sumption (assumed to be 3-6% for electricity), increased (retail) 
competition, consumer management and reduced meter reading costs 
(KEMA, 2012). 
User environment. Once the revised Smart Meter Bill came into force 
in 2012, policymakers and businesses commenced broader public 
engagement activities and pilot schemes to sensitize consumers and gain 
information about consumer preferences and market options. One pilot 
project testing dynamic pricing models, which was called “Your Energy 
Moment”, was conducted between 2012-2015 to gain experience with 
technical, economic and social options to create flexibility and increase 
sustainability in the energy consumption of consumers (Naber et al., 
2017). These kinds of activities represented a new kind of engagement 
with both users and broader societal debates. 
Business environment: DSOs also started a trial period of installation 
in 2012, during which they deployed 600,000 smart meters “to gain 
experience and signal possible problems at an early stage, in order to 
take additional measures in time for the second phase, the large-scale 
roll-out” (Dutch Government 2014). The Authority for Consumers & 
Markets and the Netherlands Enterprise Agency further investigated 
roll-out strategies, customer satisfaction and energy savings. The DSOs 
also joined forces in a ‘Smart Buying’ project (Landis and Gyr, 2014). 
Policy environment: An evaluation in 2014 found that the pilots had 
been successful and that the roll-out could be expanded (Netherlands 
Government, 2014). Concurrently, a large-scale smart meter feedback 
research programme, known as ‘Smart Metering Activation and 
Response Trials’, was carried out, which measured quantitative con-
sumption changes in energy use. The study found that households with a 
smart meter and bi-monthly home energy reports used only 0.6% less 
electricity, compared to the control group, which was a lot less than the 
3-6% reduction which underpinned the cost-benefit analysis 
(Netherlands Government, 2014). 
4.1.3. Large-scale implementation and new wave of explorations (2014- 
2019) 
Business environment: The mass roll-out started in 2014, with more 
than 1 million installations in that year (European Commission, 2019). 
The installations occurred region by region and continued relatively 
smoothly through to 2019, by which time diffusion had reached 78%. 
The roll-out was led by the DSOs whose activities were coordinated by 
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Netbeheer Nederland (Network Management Netherlands). The mass 
roll-out was also increasingly facilitated by advances in smart manage-
ment, and some DSOs (such as Enexis) worked with American platform 
developer Cisco Jasper to develop an online control centre that would 
automatically identify technical problems with the smart meters (Power 
Technology, 2018). 
User environment: Home installation was free of charge, but, as DSOs 
would have to recoup costs of the meter and installation, consumers 
would ultimately pay through their bills. In-home displays were 
optional, but customers had to pay extra for them. Although voluntary, 
the roll-out was a mix between corporate initiative and consumer 
response. Concretely, DSOs sent a letter to households, announcing that 
a smart meter would be installed in their home at a certain date (https 
://www.netbeheernederland.nl/). Consumers could refuse at no cost 
(or opt for particular smart meter settings that addressed their privacy 
concerns). But if they later changed their mind and wanted a smart 
meter, they had to pay a fee (€72.60). The roll-out thus had an ‘opt out’ 
design, whereby it was assumed that consumers were happy to have a 
smart meter, unless they actively refused. 
Technology: The mass roll-out was accompanied by new innovations 
and business models, particularly around the promise of 5G and the 
Internet-of-Things. Smart meters were increasingly seen as “an essential 
part of the smart grid” (Power Technology, 2018). Despite relatively 
smooth progress, new technical problems appeared during the roll-out, 
particularly with regard to meter inaccuracies and ineffectiveness. Some 
smart electricity meters reportedly gave readings that were higher than 
they should be (Power Engineering, 2017). The problems were linked to 
the design of the meters and how they were unable to accurately mea-
sure usage with energy efficient devices and modern switches such as 
dimmers. 
Civil society and user environment: The technical problems were 
widely reported in the media and led to an increase in meter refusals by 
households, which by the end of 2018 had reached 11%, while 2% had 
asked to deactivate the communication function (European Commis-
sion, 2019). Technical innovations also led to new consumer products 
and business models, which often related to smart phones. About 18% of 
consumers with a smart meter also adopted an ‘energy consumption 
manager’, such as a smart thermostat, which offers direct feedback to 
allow energy consumption reductions (European Commission, 2019). 
4.2. United Kingdom 
4.2.1. Top-down government initialization and planning (2005-2009) 
Policy environment: Wanting to act on climate change, the Labour 
government’s interest in smart meters was triggered by a study that 
suggested that they could lead to energy savings between 5% and 15% 
through information ‘feedback’ on energy use (Darby, 2006). Smart 
meters were thus seen as a tool for empowering consumers to save en-
ergy while also enabling the grid to manage increasing amounts of 
intermittent renewables (Xenias et al., 2015). The 2006 EU Directive 
further stimulated the government to start debating which “forms of 
metering, tariffing and billing are feasible” (Darby, 2008: 70). In 2008, 
the government announced its decision to provide smart meters to all 
households by 2020 (Sovacool et al., 2017). The 2009 impact assess-
ment of the Smart Meter Implementation Programme (SMIP) suggested 
that the implementation of 53 million residential and non-domestic gas 
and electricity meters by 2020 would cost about £8.1 billion. The gov-
ernment also decided to make energy suppliers responsible for the 
roll-out and ruled that they would bear the up-front costs, which they 
could subsequently recover through consumer energy bills (Sovacool 
et al., 2017). The suppliers were considered to be well placed to do this 
due to their long-standing experience of dealing with customers and 
their more dynamic reputation compared to DSOs (Bolton and Foxon, 
2015). 
Technology: The government’s 2008 decision stipulated that smart 
meters should include in-home display (IHD) units. This technical 
specification decision was made before the results of smart meter pilots, 
such as the Energy Demand Research Project (EDRP) from 2007 to 2010, 
were collated and analysed (Darby, 2009). 
Business environment: The energy supply companies were willing to 
be involved in the smart meter roll-out, because their involvement in the 
EDRP-pilots had provided them with positive results (Darby et al., 
2015). The government’s CBA also suggested that smart meters would 
have large supply-side benefits and cost savings, e.g. removing the need 
for meter reading site visits, reduced consumer queries and call centre 
traffic about estimated bills, cheaper consumer switching, and enhanced 
grid management. The energy companies did, however, argue against 
the inclusion of IHDs (which added costs and complicated installation), 
but the government rejected this. 
Consumers and civil society: The SMIP’s steering committee 
comprised DECC officials and industry actors, but no consumer or civil 
society organisations, whose involvement was thus minimal (Sovacool 
et al., 2017). Design specifications and legislation were also “developed 
in a largely top-down industry-led process with little input from, or 
attention to, the householder” (Pullinger et al., 2014: 1158). 
4.2.2. Protests, hiccups, and superficial attention to complaints (2010- 
2015) 
Policy environment: During the preparation stage, parliamentary 
committee enquiries raised major concerns (NAO, 2014; PAC, 2012). In 
addition to rising cost estimations, the rapid pace of technological 
change, data security, and implementation efficiency, the enquiries 
pointed to continuing uncertainties over how customers might gain from 
the roll-out. In response, the government published successive CBAs, 
which suggested that rising costs would be offset by rising benefits (see 
Table 2), leading to increasingly positive estimates of net present value. 
The 2014 CBA suggested that consumers and energy companies would 
enjoy the largest benefits (Fig. 4). 
Observing Dutch social acceptance problems with mandatory roll- 
out, UK policymakers announced in 2012 that their smart meter roll- 
out would be voluntary, based on an ‘opt-in’ model, in which con-
sumers had to ask energy companies for a smart meter (Orlowski and 
Bray, 2012). 
Technology: Early implementations showed that smart meters did 
not work well in high-rise flats, basements and rural areas (Sovacool 
et al., 2017). Indeed, by early 2015, 134,000 of the 1.3 million new 
“smart” meters installed only functioned as traditional meters, requiring 
manual readings due to technical limitations (Gosden, 2015). A further 
problem was that first-generation (‘SMETS1’) meters were incompatible 
with some suppliers, which complicated consumer switching. 
Civil society: Negative media discourses started to coalesce around 
three main issues: technical functionality, costs, and privacy (Hielscher 
and Sovacool, 2018). Problems with technical functionality in certain 
settings were widely covered. In 2015, OVO Energy and EDF reported 
that 6% of their installed meters were experiencing billing problems and 
0.5% were experiencing technical glitches (Palmer, 2015). This led to 
media reports about hundreds of thousands of households potentially 
being “trapped” with malfunctioning meters and a large backlog of 
customer complaints (Shannon, 2015). Although it was expected that 
future software upgrades could convert SMETS1 meters to SMETS2 
meters, these problems tarnished SMIP’s public reputation and also left 
Table 2 
Successive cost-benefit estimates of smart meter introduction programme (data 
collected from successive government impact assessments)  
Year Costs (£billion) Benefits (£billion) Net Present Value (£billion) 
2009 8,110 11,700 3,590 
2010 9,119 14,154 5,035 
2011 10,757 15,827 5,070 
2012 10,850 15,689 4,839 
2013 12,114 18,774 6,660 
2014 10,927 17,141 6,214  
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roughly 12.5 million SMETS1 meters vulnerable to running in ‘dumb 
mode’ (NAO 2018). 
Despite the government’s successive cost-benefit analyses, public 
debates also continued to express concern about rising costs. In 2015, 
the Institute of Directors published a critical report (IoD, 2015) warning 
that SMIP could become the government’s next IT disaster. Estimated 
annual household benefits were also lowered over the years, from £200 
per year in initial estimates to £46 per year in 2013 to £11 per year in 
2016 estimates (BEIS, 2016). Public debates thus increasingly ques-
tioned the underlying ‘business case’. 
Privacy was also discussed, with libertarian and conservative media 
warning that the government could use smart meters to increase its 
control and surveillance over citizens. Other concerns were that hackers 
and cyber-terrorists could break into the system to disrupt the grid or 
carry out theft or fraud by intercepting bills and private data (Sovacool 
et al., 2017). These stories, amplified by groups such as Stop Smart 
Meters!, sowed doubts among the public about the safety and security of 
smart meters and hindered the roll-out (Sovacool et al., 2019). 
These various debates generated substantial scepticism around smart 
meters, which successive UK governments have struggled to overcome 
(Hielscher and Sovacool, 2018). In turn, this scepticism led to delays and 
spiralling programme costs, appearing to confirm public doubts. Sub-
stantively, the start of the large-scale roll-out was delayed from 2014 to 
2016. 
Business environment: Evaluations of pilot studies suggested that 
energy savings from information ‘feedback’ might be more limited than 
was initially assumed, with estimated energy savings reduced from 5- 
15% to 1-3% (Shipworth et al., 2019). Companies also reported that the 
IHDs being used in SMIP had a problem of time-delay in showing 
real-time prices and then in translating these data into demand re-
ductions. These IHD problems led companies to question SMIP’s tech-
nology choices, arguing instead for cheaper apps that would allow 
phones, tablets, or personal computers to capture meter readings with 
no additional hardware cost (IoD, 2015). However, by this stage, 
SMIP-officials were committed to a standardized roll-out of IHDs, and 
reluctant to consider changes. 
Although the ‘Big Six’ energy companies (EDF, E.ON, SSE, British 
Gas, Scottish Power, N-Power) dominated energy provision in the pre-
vious period, increased consumer switching in the 2010s attracted more 
new entrants, which exacerbated competition as they took markets 
shares from the incumbents (Fig. 5). 
The logistics of the supplier-led roll-out and the fragmented nature of 
energy markets (with 72 competing energy suppliers in the period 2010- 
2015) created extra costs and delays (Sovacool et al., 2017): since 
different households in a street bought their electricity from different 
suppliers, installation could not be done on a standardized, 
street-by-street basis but had to be done through individual site visits. 
Limited public trust in energy suppliers further undermined the roll-out, 
with growing concerns since 2016 about the health impacts of smart 
meters (Hielscher and Sovacool, 2018). 
Policy environment: To alleviate public concerns and generate in-
terest in the smart meter roll-out, the government created the Smart 
Meter Central Delivery Body in 2013, along with a new marketing 
campaign led by a new organisation, Smart Energy GB. Their campaigns 
featured advertisements with personified units of gas and electricity 
(“Gaz” and “Leccy”), which were disseminated via television, print, and 
email (Sovacool et al., 2017). 
In response to concerns about limited consultation about issues such 
as fuel poverty and vulnerabilities (particularly focusing on the elderly 
and digital exclusion), the government also strengthened its engagement 
with civil society organizations, such as Consumer Futures, Fuel Poverty 
Advisory Group, and Age UK. These organizations shared their experi-
ences and insights that could feed into the large-scale roll-out (NAO, 
2018). 
Following the consultations, the government also introduced the 
requirement that suppliers/installers demonstrate the smart meter to 
consumers and offer energy savings advice during the physical instal-
lation (BEIS, 2018). Energy companies disliked this requirement, 
because it raised costs and slowed installation. But the government 
persisted because the face-to-face interaction during installation was 
deemed essential in securing the potential gains from energy con-
sumption through behaviour change (BEIS, 2018). Subsequent imple-
mentation of this requirement has been mixed, because energy advice 
was often given in a rushed and routinized way to satisfy targets. 
4.2.3. Stilted progress and lingering doubts (2016-2019) 
Business environment: The large-scale roll-out commenced in 2016, 
but installation failures remained commonplace, with more than 10% of 
Fig. 4. High-level overview of benefits of the UK smart meter program (Author’s modification of DECC, 2014: 15), total amount is £17.141 billion)  
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homes requiring multiple visits to complete the installation (Utility 
Week, 2017). Reasons for these failures ranged from customers not 
being present and installations taking longer than expected, to meters 
not being accessible, or to difficulties with multiple occupancy proper-
ties. After two relatively successful years, quarterly installation rates 
decreased in 2018 and 2019 (Fig. 6). 
Policy environment: The government’s own policies further 
complicated the roll-out. Indeed, despite knowing that SMETS1 meters 
had problems, the government continued to force suppliers to install 
these meters in view of the looming 2020 target. It did this simply 
“because the Department [BEIS] wanted to speed up the program” 
(NAO, 2018). 
Civil society: The problems with functionalities and SMETS1 stan-
dards, combined with years of negative debates, tarnished the public 
reputation of smart meters. Initial concerns about privacy and surveil-
lance were joined by new concerns over possible health impacts of smart 
infrastructures and more practical concerns with cost and effectiveness 
(Hielscher and Sovacool, 2018). The (un)reliability of energy companies 
and home installation problems also became issues of public debate 
(Connor et al., 2018). 
User environment: Although the first SMETS2 meters began to be 
installed in 2017, public trust remained problematic (Meadows, 2018), 
which resulted in lukewarm consumer interest. BEIS’s (2018b) own 
consumer surveys revealed that one-in-ten (11%) were not satisfied with 
their smart meter installation. Only 82% of attempted installations were 
completed on the first attempt and a further 5% were completed at a 
later date (BEIS, 2019b). Less than half of visits resulted in advice on 
how to save energy with their smart meters, and some households also 
experienced increased stress levels because their in-home display made 
them more anxious about the costs of energy use (Hodges et al., 2018). 
In 2019, only 39% of non-owners said they would seek or accept a smart 
meter within the next six months (Smart Energy GB, 2019). 
Policy environment: Because of the multitude of problems and slow 
progress, the Conservative government announced in 2019 that it would 
delay the roll-out deadline from 2020 to 2024. Although the delay is 
expected to increase total programme costs to over £13.5bn, the gov-
ernment stated that it would allow for a greater focus on consumers 
(BBC, 2019). The delay arguably also represented an accommodation of 
the interests of energy suppliers who were racking up fines for slow 
delivery (Ofgem, 2018). It also, however, reflected the views of orga-
nizations such as the Citizen’s Advice Bureau who had emphasized the 
need to focus on quality and customer care over speed. 
4.3. Norway 
4.3.1. Business push for smart meters (2000-2007) 
Business environment: The push for smart meters came from Nor-
wegian grid utilities, which saw it as a way to deal with the variability in 
hydropower (which generates about 95% of electricity in Norway, with 
another 3% from wind power), due to year-to-year differences in pre-
cipitation, which create variation in power prices (Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy 2016). Already in the mid-1990s, there were discussions 
among the 140 DSOs, which have regional grid monopolies, about smart 
meter potential for remote control of electricity use. Some DSOs engaged 
in pilot projects in the late-1990s, but these showed that smart meters 
were not economically feasible (Inderberg, 2015). 
In 2001, however, low precipitation levels and high electricity price 
volatility stimulated renewed interest from smaller, regional DSOs, who 
engaged in further pilots. Encouraging results, and Italy’s decision to 
roll-out smart meters during 2002-2005, stimulated further engagement 
with smart meters from the industry association Energy Norway (Inder-
berg, 2015). The Norwegian telecom-sector (particularly Telenor) also 
became interested in smart meters, which led to further technical 
development and pilot projects. These deepened the understanding of 
smart meters and broadened views on potential benefits to include peak 
shaving, grid coordination, operational benefits and consumer benefits 
(e.g., efficient billing, energy savings, energy security). In 2006, Energy 
Norway commissioned a report suggesting that consumer and societal 
Fig. 5. UK market share evolution of energy companies, 2004-2019 (Ofgem, 2020: 1)  
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benefits would be substantial (ECGroup, 2006). 
Policy environment: The government initially had a ‘hands-off’ 
attitude towards smart meters (Inderberg, 2015). But increasing interest 
from DSOs and telecom companies stimulated debates within the na-
tional regulator Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
(NVE) (Ballo, 2015). In 2006, NVE published a report that was incon-
clusive about the economic feasibility of smart meters, due to high 
regional variations (Inderberg, 2015). But because 2006 was a very dry 
year that led to heated media debates about fluctuating electricity pri-
ces, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy demanded further engage-
ment from NVE (Inderberg, 2015). Stimulated by business, media and 
political pressure, NVE signalled in 2007 that it intended to develop 
smart meter regulations aimed at a possible smart meter roll-out 
(Inderberg, 2015). 
4.3.2. Policy and business orchestration to prepare mass roll-out (2008- 
2015) 
Policy environment: To prepare more specific regulations and design 
characteristics of a possible smart meter roll-out, the regulator NVE held 
four public hearings – in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013, open to inputs 
from all stakeholders. Business organisations were crucial participants, 
because NVE “recognized that expertise on smart meters, a new field for 
regulatory practices, was to be found largely with the interest organi-
zations, research institutions and DSOs” (Inderberg, 2015: 101-102). 
The first public hearing discussed new metering regulations including 
remote control by DSOs. At the time, NVE estimated that about a dozen 
of Norway’s 140 DSOs had implemented smart meters, that most of 
these were small with less than 15,000 users each, and tentatively tar-
geted 2013 for a smart meter roll-out (NVE, 2008). 
The 2009 public hearing focused on implementation feasibility, 
which led to a decision to delay the roll-out from 2013 to 2014, while 
major players advocated further delay to early 2017. Other discussion 
items were prosumer interests, data protection, and the 80% roll-out 
requirement by 2020 of the 2009 EU Directive (Inderberg 2015). Dur-
ing the 2011 hearing, smart meters received high political attention, due 
to the dry and cold winter of 2010, which create high electricity price 
volatility. This led to the smart meter regulation that approved a 
mandatory roll-out of over 2.5 million smart meters by DSOs by 2017. 
Two years later, in 2013, however, the roll-out deadline was suddenly 
pushed back to 2019 for “unclear political reasons” (Inderberg, 
2015:103). Although a 2015 cost-benefit analysis was negative, the 
roll-out target was maintained because sectoral actors argued that smart 
meters would have benefits that were difficult to foresee and quantify 
(Ballo, 2015). 
Technology: The public hearings and on-the-ground projects led to 
various adjustments in technical specifications. The in-home display and 
remote steering options were both dropped after the 2009 hearings 
(Inderberg 2015), while the 2011 hearing led to inclusion of an open 
communication channel accessible to third parties. 
Business environment: Industry players were keenly involved in 
debates about design specifics of the roll-out program and interacted 
closely with NVE. This led to the early identification of streamlining roll- 
out needs such as standardisation which, while not mandatory, was 
regarded as desirable by Energy Norway, given the large number of DSOs 
in a small market. It was also decided that smart meter investment costs 
would be paid by DSOs, who would recover these in small annual chunks 
through grid access charges (Ballo, 2015). And it was decided that the 
roll-out would be mandatory with limited opt-out options and stiff 
penalties (which could exceed €200). 
While some DSOs had started the roll-out by 2013, most smart me-
ters installations were planned for 2017 and 2018 (Alskaif and van Sark, 
2016). This provided extra time for pilot programs, which multiplied, as 
DSOs were keen to test communication infrastructures, data manage-
ment programs, and various feedback solutions. 
Wider publics: While parliamentary committee and public hearings 
brought discussions into the wider public sphere, societal debates were 
characterized by limited concern. One reason for this de-politicisation is 
that smart metering was not framed and understood as a transformative 
technology but as a technical upgrade of the electricity grid representing 
the ‘next natural step’ (Inderberg, 2015: 98). This was also visible in the 
technical design choices (which excluded IHDs and remote control). 
Another reason is that Norway is characterized by relatively high levels 
of trust in public institutions, which led most people to regard the smart 
meter roll-out as properly considered by NVE and the Ministry. Even the 
investment of 10 billion kroner (approximately €1 billion), which rep-
resented significant uncertainties, and gradual recovery of over €300 per 
consumer, did not trigger much societal debate. 
User environment: Although consumer organisations were formally 
consulted during the public hearings, their influence was relatively 
limited because they were not well integrated into the NVE policy 
streams (Inderberg, 2015). During the 2009 public hearing, the idea of 
in-home displays was dropped, despite some advocacy by consumer 
organisations. The rationale was that Norwegian consumers were not 
very concerned about reducing electricity use, because they viewed 
hydro-power as renewable. Instead of IHDs, it was decided that smart 
meters should have an open communication channel for third-party 
interfaces, which would enable consumers to access consumption data 
if they wanted. 
Fig. 6. Quarterly installation of smart meters by large suppliers in Great Britain, 2013-2019 (data from BEIS, 2019a)  
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4.3.3. Rapid roll-out and smart meter installation (2016-2019) 
Policy environment: The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy left 
oversight and control of the mass roll-out to NVE, which adopted a top- 
down technocratic implementation style. The mass roll-out was tightly 
controlled, overseen and pushed by policymakers (e.g. through pen-
alties) and supported by industrial interests. The roll-out was success-
fully implemented, reaching 97% installation by January 2019. 
Business environment: The 2013 deadline delay (from 2017 to 2019) 
gave DSOs an adequate planning horizon, and the mass roll-out pro-
ceeded generally smoothly, increasing cumulatively from 414,000 by 
December 2016, to 1.85 million by December 2017, and 2.9 million by 
December 2018. Implementation was also done efficiently, costing 10% 
below initial estimates (at 9 billion kroner). Although smart meters 
created benefits for industry players, these were limitedly passed on to 
consumers (Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019). 
Technology: An additional innovation realized during the roll-out 
was Elhub, which aggregates and makes available all electricity con-
sumption and production metrics for Norway, and continuously pro-
cesses electricity market functions. This benefitted DSOs and suppliers 
by enabling a more integrated market for retail electricity in Norway 
and the wider Nordic region. Allowing seamless data flow on energy use 
to validated actors (including third-parties) eased the management of 
customer information, supplier switching, metering and billing.4 Addi-
tionally, a stream of user-oriented applications and Internet-of-Things 
gadgets was becoming more widely available, supported by data ac-
cess through Elhub. 
Wider publics: There were protest groups such as ‘Stopp smartmå-
lene’ (stop smart meters, established in 2018), campaigns like ‘Nei til 
Smartmålere’ with about 4,000 signatures5, and Facebook groups with 
thousands of members against smart meters. But such expressions of 
public concern had limited traction on wider public debates, which 
remained relatively muted. 
User environment: Smart meter installation in people’s homes was 
mandatory and backed by penalties for blocking installation. Opting out 
was possible, but only for users with low consumption and a demon-
strable disadvantage due to installation, or on the grounds of radiation 
concerns supported by a medical certificate. The opt-out rate was rela-
tively low at 0.3%, plus 0.2% on medical grounds (NVE 2019; also see 
www.nymaler.no), which indicates that most people had limited 
concerns. 
Tech-savvy users were offered a range of offerings, such as Swedish 
company Tibber’s smartphone application, to analyse home energy use 
and enable energy saving. But real-life experiments found that such 
interventions only enabled substantial energy savings for unusually 
proactive users, while most participants did not sustain interest (Sareen 
and Rommetveit, 2019). Smart meters have thus generated relatively 
limited benefit for users. 
4.4. Portugal 
4.4.1. Business-led experimentation with smart meters (2006-2011)) 
Business environment: The Portuguese push for smart meters came 
from companies, particularly Energias de Portugal (EDP), a vertically 
integrated multinational energy company, and its subsidiary ‘EDP Dis-
tribucao’ (EDPD), which is the Distributed System Operator (DSO) for 
mainland Portugal. One reason for this push related to Portuguese power 
generation, which was an early leader in renewable electricity produc-
tion (mostly wind, which grew from 58 MW in 1999 to 4,364 MW in 
2011 and 5,313 MW of installed capacity in 2017, by which time its 
annual penetration was 24% (Bento and Fontes, 2015; Costa et al., 
2019). The DSO was interested in smart meters as an enabler of a shift 
towards demand-response and smart grids, which it saw as a way of 
dealing with intermittent renewable electricity, which was expected to 
increase further while there were also plans to electrify more sectors. 
EDP thus perceived smart meters as part of a wider industrial strategy 
that included smart public lighting, demand side response (DSR), 
advanced digitalised electricity supply, and electric vehicles charging 
via the Mobi.e programme (Crispim et al., 2014). Another reason was 
that EDP saw the Portuguese market as a testing ground for new tech-
nologies and services that they hoped to subsequently implement in 
other operating markets like Brazil. 
Technology: Testing and learning with smart meters began in 2007 
with the prestige project EDP Inovgrid featuring 30,000 users in the town 
of Evora. The smart meters included in-home displays (IHD) to monitor 
consumption and (for solar prosumers) production. These so-called 
‘Energy boxes’ communicated with Distribution Transformer Control-
lers (DTC), which improved grid intelligence for the DSO. Inovgrid 
became a leading European smart grid project, showing how a system 
can enable smooth system data flows for efficiency and grid control. 
Policy environment: Policymakers and the Energy Services Regula-
tory Authority (ERSE) initially had limited engagement with smart 
meters. The 2012 cost-benefit analysis for smart electricity meters was 
positive (cost estimated at €99 and benefits at €202 per meter), but 
deemed inconclusive because of reliability doubts. Under the EU 
Directive, Portugal therefore had no obligation to complete a smart 
meter roll-out within eight years. Although Portuguese policymakers did 
not set targets, they did pass several primary laws to enable (but not 
mandate) smart metering (‘Decreto-Lei n◦ 215-A/2012’ and ‘Decreto-Lei 
n◦ 231/2012’). 
Wider publics: Public debate hardly focused on smart meters, but 
instead focused on the financial crisis, economic recession and austerity 
politics, which deeply affected Portugal between 2008 and 2015. 
Average household primary energy consumption decreased by 13% from 
2005 to 2013 (Nunes, 2018). Meanwhile, rising electricity prices exac-
erbated hardship and anger. The reputation and public trust in EDP was 
further damaged by scandals, such as ‘revolving door’ politics and 
favourable wind energy contracts (Silva and Pereira, 2019), leading to a 
low-trust sectoral context. 
User environment: Consumers had limited engagement with smart 
meters. But electricity market liberalization in 2006 did give them more 
freedom to switch to new suppliers, which they increasingly used in 
subsequent years (Lopes et al., 2016). 
4.4.2. Continued business pilots supported by policy incentives (2012- 
2015) 
Business environment: EDPD continued to implement pilot projects 
as part of a wider smart grid strategy, including demand response pro-
grammes and direct load control (Lopes et al., 2016). EDPD expanded its 
Evora pilot to install 100,000 Energy boxes in six different locations, 
replicating the initial model of a plug-and-play solution ahead of an 
envisaged full roll-out. But before making long-term investments in a 
roll-out, EDPD wanted to ensure continued control of Portugal’s distri-
bution network. This was uncertain, however, because the long-term 
licenses were due to be tendered by Portuguese municipalities by 2020. 
Technology: While the new Energy boxes included a Home Area 
Network (HAN) port, they no longer included an IHD. The reason was 
that evaluations of the Inovgrid project suggested that the majority of 
users did not consult the information on the IHD and did not practice 
demand-side management (Guerreiro et al., 2015). 
Policy environment: Although policymakers did not articulate smart 
meter targets, ERSE introduced an incentive in 2012 that offered the 
DSO a 1.5% premium on the rate of return for ‘smart’ investments that 
enhanced distribution grid efficiency. The Portuguese case thus repre-
sents a “voluntary roll-out without a legislative mandate and with the 
primary goal of value maximization” (Pereira et al., 2018: 438). It is also 
characteristic of close cooperation between the regulator and the DSO, 
and consistent with the generally risk-averse policy style (Nunes, 2018). 
4 Cf. NVE’s National Report 2017: https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/ 
5988265/C17_NR_Norway-EN.pdf/ (accessed 05.03.2020).  
5 See https://www.underskrift.no/vis/5946. 
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Even when a 2015 cost-benefit analysis was clearly positive (estimated 
cost at €333 and benefits at €467), Portuguese policymakers eschewed 
formal commitment to a target, despite EU requirements. 
Wider publics: Since there was no formal target for a smart meter 
roll-out, societal debate remained muted. Smart meters were not asso-
ciated with high risks (Guerreiro et al., 2015). They were an innovation 
the DSO was rolling out without charging users equipment costs. 
User environment: User engagement with smart meters was still 
limited (except for those involved in pilot projects). But high switching 
rates indicated active user participation in the liberalized retail elec-
tricity market (Lopes et al., 2016). 
4.4.3. Mass roll-out despite no government target (2016-2019) 
Business environment: Because of perceived benefits, the DSO 
engaged in mass roll-out despite the lack of a formal smart meter target. 
Although EDP had not yet secured the long-term grid licences, which 
were needed to continue the smart meter roll-out, it was relatively 
confident it would win these since the regulator was dependent on EDP’s 
technical expertise to work out the terms for grid licencing. Starting 
slowly in 2016, the mass roll-out gathered pace in 2017, when 600,000 
smart meters were installed, which represented 20%. By the end of 
2018, deployment reached 1.25 million. In January 2019, EDPD called 
for greater regulatory clarity, because institutional uncertainties were 
affecting the roll-out.6 ERSE responded (see below) and the roll-out 
continued at pace, reaching 2.5 million cumulative installations by 
September 2019. Reaching 80-100% deployment by 2022-23 thus seems 
feasible. 
Not all went smoothly, however. An independent audit during 2017- 
18 levied a penalty against EDPD, because it had knowingly installed 
and charged for sub-standard equipment. EDPD had to reimburse 
affected consumers and replace the sub-quality meters. EDPD therefore 
secured a procurement deal for 800,000 well-tested smart meters with 
Siemens Portugal and Landis and Gyr (who had also supplied meters to 
Iberdrola in Spain). 
The smart meter roll-out program and move towards smart grids was 
accompanied by organisational learning and an internal change pro-
gram ‘move2future’, which aimed to transform EDPD’s operational 
processes, systems and organisational structures (Nunes et al., 2017). 
Technology: Innovators also aimed to align the Energy box with 
other promising technologies such as household-level battery storage. 
EDPD’s latest version of the Energy box in 2020, which was advertised 
with the slogan ‘A smart box for your smart home’, aims for further high- 
tech compatibilities, such as with Internet-of-Things devices, to open up 
new commercial opportunities in relation to smart homes.7 
Policy environment: Despite another positive cost-benefit analysis in 
2018, the government continued to refrain from adopting a formal roll- 
out target. But in 2019, ERSE did establish a new regulatory framework 
for smart meters (including technical specifications), which aimed to 
provide greater clarity for business investment. 
Future distribution grid concessions were not settled, however. A 
new Ministry of Environment and Energy Transition, formed in late 
2018, challenged ERSE’s proposal for grid licensing concessions, pro-
longing uncertainty for the DSO. These concessions were a topic of 
extended discussions, including parliamentary hearings in 2018 and 
2019, which led municipalities to delay the floating of tenders for 
licenses. 
User environment: Smart meter installations were free of charge for 
households, but mandatory. The DSO would decide about meter 
replacement, but had the obligation to inform consumers about smart 
meter use and smart grid services. The DSO retained smart meter 
ownership and partly recovered installation costs through payments 
from premium rate incentives. Smart meter users had the option of 
paying to access their consumption data (including real-time solar 
production for prosumers), but not many used this option. Since the 
Table 3 
Summary of societal embedding processes in smart meter programs in four countries. Note: ICT = Information and Communication Technology. IHD = In-Home 
Display. DSO = Distribution System Operator. SMETS = Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications.   
Netherlands UK Norway Portugal 
Business  
implementation 
By DSOs, who initially supported 
smart meters for narrow reasons (e. 
g. billing), but later also explored 
other opportunities, leading to 
proliferation of projects after 2017 
with new products and smart-grid 
based energy services. 
By energy suppliers, who became 
more hesitant because of technical 
problems and because cut-throat 
commercial competition changed 
their priorities. 
By DSOs, who pushed for smart 
meters to deal with intermittent 
hydro-power and enhance supply- 
side efficiencies. 
By DSOs, who pushed for smart 
meters to deal with intermittent 
wind power and as part of wider 
industrial strategy (energy 
services, exports). 
Policymakers Initially top-down planning, but 
more collaborative after protests. 
Top-down planning (with early 
targets and specifications). 
Implementation problems created 
delays and led to (reluctant) 
adjustments. 
Limited initial engagement, but 
then increasing move towards 
technocratic roll-out program. 
Limited initial engagement, but 
gradual move towards stronger 




Initially mandatory, but changed to 
voluntary after protests. Consumers 
can ‘opt-out’ (which 11% of 
population did). Some decline in 
consumer trust due to media reports 
about technical problems during 
mass roll-out. 
Voluntary (‘opt-in’). Some initial 
consumer interest, but stagnation 
after 2017 due to declining consumer 
trust because of technical problems, 
critical media debates, and negative 
reputations of energy suppliers. 
Mandatory, but households can 
refuse in exceptional circumstances 
(which only 0.3% did). High 
confidence in government and 
technology (due to positive earlier 
ICT experiences). 
Mandatory. Fairly passive 
acceptance, with cost of roll-out 
being absorbed by DSO and not 
placed on users. Moderate 
consumer confidence because 
scandals tarnished company 
reputation. 
Wider publics Strong initial opposition (about 
privacy concerns), which took 3-4 
years to address. Subsequent roll-out 
was relatively quick. 
Limited initial debate, but gradually 
increasing concerns about costs, 
technical problems, and privacy 
created social acceptance problems. 
Limited public debate or opposition 
with costs recovered over many 
years. 




Societal protests led to various 
technical adjustments. IHD was 
optional extra. 
Specifications articulated early on, 
including IHD. Subsequent mass roll- 
out encountered various problems 
with (e.g. SMETS1) that led to 
reluctant adjustments. 
Public hearings and pilot projects 
led to adjustments (e.g. dropping 
IHD and remote steering) before 
mass roll-out. 
Pilot projects led to technical 
adjustments (e.g. ‘closed’ energy 
box without IHD) with paid 
accessories made available.  
6 See https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/smart-meter-woes-h 
old-back-digitalisation-of-eu-power-sector/ (accessed 14.02.2020). 
7 See https://www.edp.pt/particulares/servicos/redy-en/how-it-works/ 
(accessed 14.02.2020). 
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Energy box (without IHD) provided limited engagement opportunities, 
its benefits were unclear for many users. A 2019 survey found that only 
35% of respondents knew what a smart meter is (Chawla et al., 2019). 
Wider publics: Colloquially and in online forums complaints around 
erratic billing were ubiquitous, even after smart meter installation, and 
usually concerned EDPC (which likely reflects its dominant market po-
sition as a supplier). 
5. Discussion and analysis 
5.1. Different diffusion trajectories resulting from varied societal 
embedding processes 
The four cases demonstrate that the accelerated diffusion of smart 
meters required alignment between technology and the four 
Fig. 7. Interpretive summary of temporal societal embedding patterns, with event sequences driving varying degrees of alignment (between smart meter technology 
and environments) 
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environments from the societal embedding framework. The 
Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal achieved this alignment (although 
in different ways), while the UK only partially succeeded, which ex-
plains recent stagnation in diffusion and delay in meeting targets. In all 
four cases, the initial push for smart meter diffusion came from gov-
ernment and/or business. But, as summarised in Table 3, the cases differ 
substantially in terms of how these actors subsequently engaged with 
consumers and wider publics and how technical specifications were 
adjusted (or not). 
While the quantitative curves in Fig. 3 suggest that smart meter 
diffusion is a similar kind of process in the four countries with some 
variation in speed and depth of adoption, Table 3 implies that the 
qualitative diffusion trajectories varied considerably due to differences in 
societal embedding processes, e.g. in terms of which actors were the 
main drivers and what motivated them; the degree and content of public 
concerns; the way in which consumers were approached and how they 
responded; the roles and strategic considerations of companies; and how 
and when policymakers engaged with the implementation process. 
Smart meter technologies also varied across the cases in terms of 
technical specifications and interpretations of their effects. Smart meters 
in Norway and Portugal were interpreted as part of wider envisaged 
transformations towards smart grids, demand-side response and broader 
industrial strategies. By contrast, actors in the Dutch and UK roll-outs 
initially assumed that smart meters would be transformative artefacts 
on their own (because information feedback was thought to trigger 
behaviour change and energy savings), which provided policymakers 
with a reason to push smart meter deployment.8 
As a result of these societal embedding differences, the diffusion 
trajectories varied substantially between the four cases. The following 
metaphorical categorisations aim to capture salient differences in these 
trajectories, while Fig. 7 provides an interpretive schematic summary of 
temporal societal embedding patterns.  
• The Dutch roll-out started with a push-approach but after societal 
protests, which lowered alignments, switched to a curling path, in 
which various ‘brooming’ activities (societal debate, technical ad-
justments, pilot projects) increased alignments that smoothened the 
ground for subsequent mass roll-out. 
• The UK roll-out had characteristics of a halted snow-shovelling ma-
chine, with the government powering ahead (acting as a mechanical 
‘snow-shovelling machine’) and pushing objections (‘snow’) aside, 
until accumulating social acceptance problems piled up to block and 
halt ‘the machine’, due to increasing misalignments.  
• The Norwegian program can be characterized as a ski-jump, in which 
prolonged preparations (‘descending down the ramp’) through ex-
periments, network building, and stakeholder consultations created 
alignment, which was followed by a high-speed ‘jump’ towards the 
roll-out target without much resistance.  
• And the Portuguese program can be seen as a snow-balling pathway, 
in which the first pilot project was followed by others, which enabled 
learning and alignment and steadily increased company confidence 
and roll-out momentum. 
5.2. Choices in the implementation of technology-forcing policies 
The different diffusion trajectories and societal embedding patterns 
were shaped by the choices with regard to the two implementation di-
lemmas of technology-forcing policies: a) early or late formulation of 
targets and specifications, b) technocratic or emergent-adaptive imple-
mentation style.  
• The Dutch case was characterized by an initially technocratic style and 
attempts by the government to legislate early targets, technical 
specifications, and mandatory installation. This top-down approach 
triggered civil society protests, which led to subsequent adjustments 
in technical and functional specifications, a change from mandatory 
to voluntary household adoption, and a delay in the targets. Most 
significantly, the implementation style changed from technocratic to 
emergent-adaptive, using pilot projects and public participation to 
articulate design specifics (while retaining some elements of top- 
down planning in the actual street-by-street roll-out). While these 
adjustments delayed the roll-out by a few years, the subsequent 
implementation was relatively rapid and generated further innova-
tive projects in later stages to explore the potential of smart grid and 
energy services.  
• The UK case was also characterized by a technocratic style and early 
government formulation of targets, technology specifications and a 
supplier-led roll-out model. Policymakers subsequently engaged 
primarily with businesses and corporate lobbies, creating a wide 
array of technical committees to discuss techno-economic issues, 
while paying little attention to consumers or social issues. In the 
second period (2010-2015) some of the early choices were found to 
be problematic: smart meters with SMETS1 standards had technical 
functionality problems, while the supplier-led roll-out prevented 
efficient street-by-street implementation (which is why all other 
European countries selected a DSO-led model). Public concerns 
about costs and privacy also negatively affected consumer attitudes. 
In response, UK policymakers and businesses adopted some elements 
of the emergent-adaptive implementation style such as consultation 
with civil society organizations and more pilot projects. But, contrary 
to the Netherlands, the resulting adjustments remained relatively 
superficial, e.g. new marketing campaigns, which represent one- 
directional information provision rather than bi-directional 
engagement. Ironically, one more substantial change (the switch to 
an ‘opt-in’ model for household adoption), which UK policymakers 
made when they perceived Dutch problems with the mandatory 
model, seriously underestimated the indifference and lack of trust of 
consumers, which, combined with ongoing public concerns, ham-
pared diffusion after 2017.  
• The Norwegian case was characterized by relatively late targets and 
an (initially) emergent-adaptive implementation style, in which DSOs 
advanced smart meters through early sequences of pilot projects that 
enabled social interaction and learning processes, which broadened 
and deepened understanding about possible benefts to include peak 
shaving, grid coordination, efficiency gains and consumer benefits. 
Policymakers became more involved in the second phase (2008- 
2016), when they interacted closely with businesses to articulate 
technological and organizational roll-out specifics. This included the 
formulation of formal targets and an accompanying shift towards 
more technocratic planning, in which policymakers centrally coor-
dinated and enforced the roll-out, which proceeded smoothly and 
rapidly in the third phase without much user involvement.  
• The Portuguese case was characterized by no targets (which we 
interpret as very late targets) and an emergent-adaptive implementation 
style, in which a major pilot project (EDP Inovgrid) and subsequent 
spin-offs enabled learning about the technology and consumer 
preferences. In the second phase (2012-2015), policymakers intro-
duced a financial incentive to stimulate smart meter deployment, but 
refrained from adopting a formal target, despite a positive CBA in 
2015. This was because the large incumbent DSO was already 
diffusing smart meters based on its wider smart grid and industrial 
strategy considerations, and because the regulator and DSO had 
cooperative relations. In the third phase (2015-2019), however, the 
DSO asked for greater regulatory clarity to accompany and underpin 
the relatively rapid and smooth roll-out. 
Combining the two implementation dilemmas, Fig. 8 maps the initial 
8 In retrospect, however, these transformative effects on energy consumption 
were wildly over-estimated and nowhere near the initial estimates. 
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choices in each country-case in a 2×2 matrix and the later adjustments 
in implementation styles that were made during the roll-out process: the 
Netherlands and Norway changed to different kinds of implementation 
styles, while the UK and Portugal made smaller adjustments that stayed 
within the initial style.9 
This analysis suggests that there are (at least) two patterns for the 
successful implementation of technology-forcing policies: 
1) Start with early targets and a technocratic style, but make ad-
justments (in technology specifications and perhaps implementation 
style) if there are substantial societal protests or technical problems 
(which the Netherlands did better than the UK). 
2) Start with an emergent-adaptive style and formulate targets later 
(once technical and social stabilisation has occurred), which can then be 
enforced with less risk of substantial opposition (particularly Norway; 
Portugal to a lesser extent). 
These two patterns point to an overarching tension for technology- 
forcing policies, which, should, on the one hand, provide a coordi-
nated push to focus and drive technology deployment and, on the other 
hand, allow some degree of openness and flexibility to enable sufficient 
learning, stakeholder engagement, and mutual adjustment. The two 
patterns each start on one side of this overarching challenge and then 
gradually accommodate elements from the other side. 
5.3. Style changes to mitigate drawbacks of initial choices 
With regard to this overarching challenge, each country experienced 
some of the potential drawbacks of initial choices specified in Table 1, 
which led to changes in their implementation style. The Netherlands and 
the UK both experienced some of the drawbacks of early targets/speci-
fications and a technocratic style, but responded differently (see 
Fig. 8. Changing implementation styles during smart meter diffusion in the four cases  
Table 4 
Responses to drawbacks of early targets and technocratic implementation style 
in the Netherlands and UK smart meter roll-out  
Potential drawbacks of 
early targets: 
Netherlands UK 
-Unrealistic targets prove 
difficult to meet, 
leading to impression of 
failure. 
- Early specifications 
may turn out to be 
wrong. 
- No. Adjustments 
created some delay, but 
prepared ground for later 
successful roll-out. 
- Partial. Initial 
specifications were 
adjusted in response to 
early protests, so were 
not wrong later on. 
- Yes. Although diffusion 
is still progressing, the 
roll-out is perceived as 
failure. 
- Yes. Early choices (e.g. 
SMETS1, supplier-led roll- 
out, consumer ‘opt-in’ 
model) created problems 
later on. 
Potential drawbacks of 
technocratic style: 
Netherlands UK 
- Narrow stakeholder 
engagement and social 
acceptance problems; 
- Ignoring broader 
considerations; 
- Reluctance to learn 
and make adjustments. 
- Initially yes. But early 
change to more 
participation improved 
social acceptance. 
- Initially yes. Therefore 
early consideration of 
wider issues. 
- No. Substantial 
willingness to learn and 
adjust. 
- Yes. Subsequent 
consultation remained 
narrow and restrained by 
technocratic style. 
- Yes. Subsequent 
considerations remained 
narrow. 
- Yes. Adjustments 
remained superficial.  
Table 5 
Responses to drawbacks of late targets and emergent style in the Norwegian and 
Portuguese smart meter roll-out  





and slows diffusion. 
Yes. Slow policy 
engagement and late 
targets created some 
uncertainty. This led to a 
shift towards a 
centralized planning 
style in the second and 
third phases. 
No. Lack of targets did 
not delay commitments 
or diffusion (because 
smart meters were 
aligned with wider 
corporate strategies). 








- Slow initial diffusion 
due to time-consuming 
articulation process and 
delayed formal 
commitment. 




- Yes. Therefore shift 
towards centralized 
planning style to 
accelerate diffusion. 
- No. Dominant DSO 
(EDPD) was involved in 
all projects.. 
- Partially. Pilot projects 
were large to start with. 
But there was a push for 
more regulatory clarity in 
the third phase.  
9 The Dutch case also involved a change in the timing of initial targets, as 
early attempts at legislation were rejected by the Senate, leading to later 
formulation of targets. 
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Table 4). Dutch policymakers were willing to make substantial adjust-
ments to mitigate the drawbacks, which resonates with the country’s 
political consensus and compromise culture. 
The UK also experienced drawbacks of initial choices, but policy-
makers made only limited adjustments to address the problems 
(Table 4). This resonates with the UK’s centralized political culture and 
top-down leadership style, observed by King (2015: 283): “The gov-
ernment in the UK is still meant to govern – full stop. It is not meant to, 
and does not, share power with others. (…) The government of the day is 
expected to take the initiative. The government of the day acts. Others 
react. (…) Reforms (…) are not negotiated painstakingly with stake-
holders. They are handed down from above by governments”. The UK’s 
continued adherence to a top-down planning style was a major reason 
for the stagnated diffusion, because it insufficiently accommodated 
stakeholder engagement and the intrinsic uncertainties of radical 
innovations. 
Norway and Portugal differentially experienced some of the draw-
backs of late targets/specification and emergent-adaptive style, leading to 
different responses (Table 5). In response to regulatory uncertainties and 
the slow speed of emergent learning and interaction processes, Norwe-
gian policymakers shifted towards a more centralized planning style in 
later periods. Norwegian consumers and stakeholders accepted this style 
change, because they generally trust their government and because 
positive experiences with earlier ICT roll-out programs had reduced 
people’s concerns about privacy (Ballo, 2015). 
Potential drawbacks did not strongly manifest themselves in 
Portugal (Table 5), mostly for case-specific reasons such as the presence 
of a DSO that was committed to smart meters for broader strategic 
reasons, which is why implementation style changes remained limited. 
The Portuguese government’s reluctance to adopt a formal target also 
relates to a risk-averse political culture and tight networks between 
policymakers and EPD (Nunes, 2018). 
This analysis shows that implementation styles in all four countries 
were dynamic in the sense that policymakers made some (smaller or 
larger) changes to address the overarching tension between flexibility 
and coordinated push. Countries starting with a technocratic push 
(Netherlands, UK) later introduced more flexibility, while countries 
starting with an emergent-adaptive approach (Norway, Portugal) later 
introduced more top-down coordination. This confirms our proposition 
that both styles are extremes and that countries may combine elements 
from both over time. While Portugal and the UK both made limited 
adjustments to their initial styles, this was relatively unproblematic in 
Portugal (because the specified drawbacks associated with its style did 
not materialize prominently), but highly problematic in the UK (because 
all specified drawbacks of technocracy materialized and were insuffi-
ciently addressed), which explains its stagnated diffusion. 
6. Conclusions 
The article has shown that technology-forcing policies can accelerate 
the diffusion of new technologies into markets and society, and that 
implementation of these policies involves choices with regard to two 
dilemmas: early or late formulation of initial targets, and technocratic or 
emergent-adaptive implementation styles. These dilemmas are particu-
larly pertinent for radical innovations whose diffusion involves not only 
policymakers and firms, but also consumers and civil society organiza-
tions. We conceptualised these dilemmas using insights from the societal 
embedding of technology framework and from four different policy 
steering theories. And we empirically investigated the dilemmas with a 
comparative analysis of smart meter diffusion in four European coun-
tries, which showed that policy choices substantially shaped the diffu-
sion trajectories. 
Although there is no definitively correct way to navigate the di-
lemmas, our analysis identified two patterns for successful imple-
mentation of technology-forcing policies. The first pattern is to start 
with early targets and a technocratic style, but make sufficient 
adjustments if there are substantial protests or technical problems. This 
pattern occurred in the Dutch case, where policymakers made sub-
stantial technical and policy adjustments when they encountered. soci-
etal protest and acceptance problems. By contrast, UK policymakers 
continued to adhere to top-down technocratic implementation and did 
not make sufficient adjustments when the roll-out encountered technical 
and social acceptance problems, which derailed smart meter diffusion. 
The second pattern is to start with an emergent-adaptive style and 
formulate and enforce targets later, once technical and social stabilisa-
tion has occurred. This pattern occurred in the Norwegian case, where a 
prolonged period of learning and stakeholder interactions, which 
generated technical and social stabilisation, was followed by a shift to a 
top-down planning style that drove very rapid smart meter deployment. 
The Portuguese smart meter roll-out also started with bottom-up ini-
tiatives, but despite stabilisation policymakers did not formulate formal 
targets in later phases, although there was some shift towards more 
centralized coordination. 
Both technocratic and emergent-adaptive policy styles can thus 
accelerate technological diffusion. In fact, our analysis showed that all 
cases had elements of both styles. To navigate the overarching tension 
between flexibility and a coordinated push, countries that started with 
one style subsequently introduced elements from the other style, and 
vice versa. 
Our findings contribute not only to debates about technology-forcing 
policies, but also bear relevance for wider debates about transformative 
innovation policy and mission-oriented innovation policy, which both 
signal increasing interest in grand challenges, radical innovation, and a 
stronger role for policymakers. But, in our view, advocates of the former 
(e.g. Schot and Steinmueller, 2018) go too far in emphasising bottom-up 
experimentation and rejecting top-down planning, while advocates of 
the latter (e.g. Mazzucato, 2018) place too much emphasis on 
state-guided R&D programs and firm-led innovation (visible in their 
admiration for the Apollo or Manhattan programs, which included 
neither citizens nor civil society actors). Since neither approach suffi-
ciently engages with diffusion, our research findings offer useful com-
plements, including the following general principles: 1) while 
experimentation and learning-by-doing are important in early phases, 
centralized planning and technology-forcing policies may 
cost-effectively drive diffusion in later phases; 2) while firms and poli-
cymakers are important actors, diffusion also requires involvement of 
consumers and wider publics, not just in the up-front formulation of 
missions, but also throughout the implementation process; 3) embed-
ding technologies in wider transformation programs is likely to be a 
more effective strategy than pushing technologies as stand-alone 
transformative devices. 
Based on our case analysis, we also propose several instrumental 
suggestions for the implementation of technology-forcing policies aimed 
at accelerating diffusion10:  
• If companies are interested in the technology for strategic reasons (e. 
g. because they perceive it as part of wider transformations), start 
with an emergent-adaptive approach that stimulates learning, 
interaction and adjustments (PT, NO). If progress is too slow, shift to 
a technocratic style, including demanding deployment targets, once 
learning processes have sufficiently stabilized the technical design 
(NO).  
• If companies show moderate interest, start with a technocratic 
approach and set demanding deployment targets to push them (UK, 
NL), but refrain from detailing technical specifications to prevent 
early lock-in in sub-optimal designs (which dogged the UK case). 
• If implementation encounters substantial societal protest, make ad-
justments in roll-out specifications or implementation style that 
10 We want to thank one of the reviewers for stimulating us to discuss more 
instrumental policy suggestions. 
F.W. Geels et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104272
17
sufficiently alleviate the concerns (NL). Otherwise, diffusion may 
grind to a halt (UK).  
• Always allow for sufficient technological learning before mass roll- 
out, either by making adjustments (NL) or by delaying the formu-
lation of targets and specifications (PT, NO). Otherwise, unforeseen 
problems may occur that can hamper mass diffusion (UK). 
One weakness of our comparative and longitudinal research design is 
that we could only briefly discuss the various actors in each period and 
country. Because of inevitable trade-offs between breadth and depth, we 
were unable to more deeply investigate interpretations, motives, and 
(strategic) considerations of different actors or their coalitions. Another 
weakness is that we only limitedly addressed structural contexts for 
policy decisions and societal embedding processes. Although we 
touched on policy cultures and public trust in government institutions 
and energy companies, space constraints precluded us from delving 
more deeply into political, cultural and economic structures (including 
energy system structures). 
Nevertheless, we hope that our article has opened up new insights 
and questions with regard to accelerated diffusion and technology- 
forcing policies, which are rising again on policy agendas related to 
sustainability and low-carbon transitions, where the pace of change is 
too slow at present. The societal embedding framework is relevant for 
technology-forcing in open-ended diffusion processes, but addressing 
multiple actors and factors increases policy complexity. One interesting 
issue for future research is thus whether policymakers require new skills 
and competencies in order to analyse and manage this complexity. 
Another interesting issue is to investigate technology-forcing policies 
for innovations that are more radical and comprehensive than smart 
meters, which deviated substantially from existing capabilities of energy 
companies but were relatively inexpensive, simple in design, and 
invisible from a consumer perspective (and were framed as technical 
grid upgrades in Norway). For more radical and comprehensive in-
novations, we would not only expect involvement of more actors and 
thus higher policy complexity, but also greater implementation chal-
lenges of technology-forcing policies. The 2006 UK zero-carbon homes 
target, which stipulated that all new homes should be carbon neutral by 
2016, may be an interesting case in this respect, because persistent op-
position from housebuilders and lukewarm interest from home-buyers 
(for whom energy-efficiency is relatively unimportant compared to 
other home-purchase criteria) led to the dismantling of the technology- 
forcing policy in 2015 (O’Neill and Gibbs, 2020).11 
Lastly, having established that the technocratic implementation style 
can (sometimes) accelerate technology diffusion, it would be interesting 
to further investigate the conditions under which this style works (or 
not). Such research would thus further open up the widespread 
assumption in innovation studies that emergent-adaptive policy styles 
are necessarily better or preferable. 
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